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Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles
ABSTRACT
Prior to elections, governments (at all levels) frequently undertake a
consumption binge. Taxes are cut, transfers are raised, and government
spending is distorted towards highly visible items. The "political business
cycle" (better be thought of as "the political budget cycle") has been
intensively examined, at least for the case of national elections. A number
of proposals have been advanced for mitigating electoral cycles in fiscal
policy. The present paper is the first effort to provide a fully-specified
equilibrium framework for analyzing such proposals. A political budget cycle
arises here via a multidimensional signalling process, in which incumbent
leaders try to convince voters that they have recently been doing an excellent
job in administering the government. Efforts to mitigate the cycle can
easily prove counterproductive, either by impeding the transmission of inf or-
mation or by inducing politicians to select more costly ways of signalling.








Economists and political scientists have tried for some time to understand
the apparent coincidence of macroeconomic policy cycles and elections. But
although researchers have detected some notable empirical regularities1 (parti-
cularly concerning pre—election tax cuts and government spending increases),
progress has been impeded by the lack of a solid theoretical foundation. The
present paper is an effort to remedy this situation.
My analysis is based on an intertemporal equilibrium model in which both
voters and politicians are rational, utility-maximizing agents.2 A "political
budget cycle" arises due to temporary information asymmetries about the
incumbent leader's competence in administering the production of public goods.
Equilibrium is characterized by a multidimensional signalling process. The
model is useful in part because it delivers sharp empirical predictions con-
cerning the timing of budget cycles and elections, and the nature of the induced
fiscal distortions. Prior to elections, taxes tend to be suboptimally low
and government consumption spending suboptimally high. This public and
private consumption binge comes at the expense of government investment.
The model also provides a welfare-theoretic framework for analyzing
various reforms aimed at alleviating the political budget cycle.3 One can
explicitly analyze the effects of balanced-budget amendments and of constftu-
tional limits on the legislature's ability to undertake new tax and expenditure
initiatives directly prior to elections.I also consider the effects of
increasing central bank independence and of trying to channel pre—election
signalling into campaign expenditures. Fairly direct extensions of the
model can be applied to analyze changes in the length of politicians' terms2
in office, and the adoption of more sophisticated rules for governing the
timing of elections.
The popular perception is that political budget cycles are a bad thing.
But a central conclusion of this analysis is that the pre—election budget
antics of incumbent politicians may be a socially efficient mechanism for
diffusing up—to-date information about their competence. Efforts to mitigate
the political budget cycle can easily reduce welfare, either by impeding the
transmission of information or by inducing politicians to select more costly
(to society) ways of signalling.4
In section II, I present the model, including the constitutionally—imposed
election structure. Section III gives the equilibrium under full information,
and sections IV -VIcharacterize the fiscal policy distortions which occur
under asymmetric information. There are multiple sequential equilibria but,
following Milgrom and Roberts (1986), I apply some refinements of sequential
equilibrium to obtain a unique equilibrium. In section VII I critically assess
some proposed reforms of the political budget cycle process.
II. The Model
A. The Preferences of a Representative Agent
The economy is composed of a large number of (ex-ante identical) agents,
each of whom derives utility both from public goods and from a private
consumption good. The representative voter i is concerned with his expected
utility:




where c1 is the agent's consumption of the private good, g is the public
"consumption" good, and k is the public "investment" good. U and V are
both regular strictly concave functions, with U1, U2, V' > 0.In addition
to assuming the usual Inada conditions, I make the further assumption that
lim V(k) =— [e.g.,V(k) =logk]. The latter assumption is sufficient to
k-sO
insurean interior solution in the asymmetric information case. < 1 is
the representative agent's discount factor, E' is the expectations operator
(conditional on agent i's information set), t subscripts denote time, and I
is the agent's time horizon which may be infinite, is a random shock, which
will later be identified with nonpecuniary leader-specific factors such as
the leader's looks. Finally, x1 =0if agent i is a private citizen in
period s, and x' =Xif agent i is the country's leader in period s. X repre-
sent's nonpecuniary ego rents which accrue to the country's leader. I discuss
both r and X in more detail below.
B. Technology
At the beginning of each period, all agents exogenously receiveunits of
a nonstorable good, which can either be privately consumed or used as an input
into the production of public goods. Out of this endowment, agents must pay
in lump-sum taxes; they consume the remainder.
The technology f or providing public goods is such that exactly one agent
(a "leader") is needed to supervise production; output goes to zero if more
supervisors are added. The production function for g and k is given by5
(2) + kt+i =Tt
+
(Both g and k are measured in per capita units; population is constant
throughout.) The relative cost of producing g and k is unity, but to have the4
public "investment good" k in period t+l, the government must invest in period
t. g is nonstorable, and the stock of kt+l melts at the end of period t+1.
There are two variable inputs into the public goods production process: taxes,
r, and the leader's administrative competency, c. A competent administrator
(high e) is able to provide a given level of public goods at a lower level of
taxes than an incompetent administrator can. Competency is not a choice
variable for the leader, but an individual characteristic. c should be thought
of as administrative IQ.
C. Stochastic Structure
All agents are capable of serving as the leader. However, at any
given point in time, they differ according to their administrative competency.
For each agent i, competency evolves according to the serially-correlated
stochastic process
(3) =+ a11
where each a' is an independent drawing from a Bernoulli distribution with
p a prob(& =aH),and 1-pprob(a1 =a),aH >> - 7/2.The a shocks are
independent across agents as well as across time. One reason why competency
might realistically be thought to vary over time is that leadership abilities
well-suited to dealing with one set of historical circumstances may be poorly
suited to dealing with other types of problems. Also, in a more general
model, a leader's competency may change as his subordinates turn over. The
restriction thatfollow a first-order moving average (MA(1)] process will
turn out to simplify the analysis below considerably, as it effectively breaks
structural links between elections. However, the analysis can be extended to
allow for more general stochastic processes along the lines of Terrones (1987).5
In addition to the competency shock, each agent i experiences a "looks"
shock 17, which also follows on MA(1) process:
(4) =+ q1
where q' is a continuously distributed i.i.d. random variable on [-, ].
q and q are independent for all st, ij. In what follows, it is the
probability distribution of q13q1 - q3, ij, which matters for all the
results.I assume that q13 has probability distribution function G(q); it has
mean zero.17 is intended to capture factors relevant to an agent's leadership
ability but uncorrelated with his competence in administering the public goods
production function; e.g., his "looks". Neither c' nor matter for anything
when agent i is a private citizen. In eqs. (1) and (2) and in what follows
below, whenever £,, aor q are written without a superscript, they refer to
the incumbent.
0. The Structure of Elections
In order to determine which agent gets the honor of administering the
production of public goods, the country's constitution specifies that elec-
tions be held every other period. The incumbent leader is allowed to run for
re-election an indefinite number of times,6 whereas the opposition candidate
is chosen at random from the rest of the population.7 Under the information
structure specified below, the essential difference between the incumbent
leader and his opponent is going to be that the public can infer something
about the incumbent's most recent competency shock, but it has no way of
inferring anything about his opponent's competency. For voters, the choice
is essentially between re-electing the incumbent or selecting an agent from6
the population-at-large, all of whom appear identical cx ante.
E. The Leader's Utility Function
All agents, including the country's leader, share the same utility
function (1). Recall that the oniy difference is that x1 =0during periods
agent i is a private citizen, and x1 =Xduring periods he is the leader. As
leader, an agent enjoys "ego rents". (There is no way to have public goods
produced without yielding ego rents as a byproduct of the production process).
Although the typical citizen would like someday to be the leader, unfor-
tunately for him E(x') =0'v' s ) t, and V I j, with j denoting the country's
leader. There are a very large number of agents, and so a private citizen
attaches infinitesimal value to his chances of ever becoming leader. Thus
for a representative private citizen, the utility function (1) effectively redu-
ces to
(5) =E(r),
where "P" superscripts denote the "public". An incumbent politician, on the
other hand, has a finite probability 1r of being in office in period 5;




In the present model, I assume that a leader's motivations are entirely
selfish. But it should be clear from inspection of eq. (6) that all of the
(positive) results below would be the same under a more "generous" assumption
Specifically, one can interpret eq. (6) as saying that the leader puts some
weight on social welfare, r, and some weight on the rents he gets from7
being in office. (The model is also readily extended to the case where the
leader's rents depend on his plurality).
F. The Information Structure and the Timing of Events
Voters observe taxes i and government consumption spendingg contem-
poraneously. They also form inferences concerning government investment
spending k and the incumbent's competency shock a, but they cannot directly
confirm these inferences until the following period. In period t+1, the
government's period t investment comes on line9; voters also seea directly
in t+1.
The incumbent has a temporary information "advantage" over voters in
that he sees his competency shock immediately.I use "advantage" in quotation
marks because in fact, it will turn out that voters can useg and Tt to infer
and their inferences are always correct in equilibrium. The information
structure assumed here seems plausible since it would be costly for an indivi-
dual to closely monitor the government's performance. Moreover, there is
little private incentive for an individual to undertake such monitoringsince,
in equilibrium, he can infera costlessly using his information on and i.
Government consumption spending and taxes are variables which individuals need
to know and realistically can observe quite easily. Of course, if somegroup
were able to monitor the government, and credibly transmit that information to
individuals in a way which would be costless for them to process, that would
preclude a political budget cycle in the analysis below. Clearly, neither the
opposition candidate nor the incumbent can provide this service, since their
statements cannot be trusted. The results below should go through in a more
general setting in which some voters monitor as long as there is a pool
of "uniformed" voters who infer instead.8
The public, of course, has no way of inferring a, where "o" superscripts
denote the opponent. (The opponent has no way of knowing a0 either, until he
actually tries his hand at running the government.) All voters know about the
opponent's competency is the probability distribution of a. Prior to Voting,
voters do observe both and q, the "looks" shocks.
The incumbent sets g and T prior to observing the q's. The rationale for
this assumption is that it takes time to collect taxes and to operate the
government production function. The q shocks, on the other hand, capture
information revealed in the election-eve debates or uncertainty about a last-
minute scandal concerning one of the candidates. In an alternative version of
the model, q might represent uncertainty about election-day weather, and hence
about the composition of voters who come to the polls. Table 1 presents the
timing of events.
In deciding his vote, the representative voter compares his expected Uti-
lity under each of the twocandidates.If u = 1 denotes a vote for the
incumbent, and u=0 a vote for his opponent, then
I'I ) E' r
(7)
t 0,otherwise.
III. Equilibrium Under Full Information
Before proceeding, it is useful to analyze the equilibrium which would
arise if voters could directly observe a prior to voting. In this case, the
incumbent's pre-election fiscal policy cannot possibly affect voters' expec-
tations about his post—election competency, and thus can have no effect on his
chances of remaining in office. With the r terms in (6) exogenous, the
incumbent's decision problem becomes equivalent to maximizing the welfare of
the representative agent, r. Given the simple production and storage tech—9
nology, this intertemporal maximization problem can be broken down into a
sequence of static maximization problems:
(8) max U(ct, + V(kt+i), V t
subject to (2) and
(9)Cty-Tt,
(10) kt+i, gt ) 0.
Equation (9) is a private agent's budget constraint. Note that r is allowed
to take on negative values (there can be transfers as well as taxes))0
It is convenient to rewrite the above maximization problem by substituting
the constraints (2) and (9) into (8) and (10):
(11) max W(g, r, €) iU(-r,g) + V(r+£ -g)
T,g
s.t. 0, T + £ —g0.
(t subscripts will henceforth be omitted where the meaning is obvious.) The
first-order conditions for an interior solution to (11) imply
(12) U1( —T,g) =U2(
—r,g) =V'(T+ c —g).
That the solution must be interior follows from the Inada conditions on U
and V. It is readily confirmed that there is a unique (g*(e), r*(c)] which
satisfies (12), and that this point is a global maximum) Clearly
W*(e)W*(g*(c), T*(C), ci10
is strictly increasing in c and, if all goods are normal, then c*(c), g*(c)
and k*(e) are also increasing in c. Then by (9), T*(c) must be decreasing.
If t is an election period, then by eqs. (3), (4), (5), (7) and (11), the




Because c andfollow MA(1) processes, voters' expected utility is the same
under either candidate for periods t+2 and beyond, and thus only expectations
over t+1 enter into (13).(Recall from Table 1 that voters observe and
q prior to the election.)
If voters observe =priorto voting, then the first term in eq. (13)
is given by
(14) E(W*(ct+i)1at = QH=pW*(2at)+ (l_p)W*(aH + aL).
If voters instead observe =aL,then
(15) E[W*(ct+i)Iat =at]QL =pW*(aH+ aL) + (1-.p)W*(2a1).
Voters have no observations on the opponent's competency; hence
(16) E(W*(e1)]
QO=p2W*(2aH)+ 2p(l_p)W*(aH + aL) + (1_p)2W*(2aL).
Clearly, > QO >
IV. Optimality for Voters and Leaders Under Asymmetric Information
I now return to the asymmetric information structure summarized in table
1. Although the public cannot directly observe a until period t+1, they can
form "beliefs" about a given their observations on and Tt. These beliefs11
can be parameterized as P(gt. Tt), where p is the probability weight the
public attaches to the possibility that =a1(Since a_1 will be a fixed,
known parameter throughout the next three sections, I abbreviate
Tt;a1) as p(g, T).] The incumbent will be described as a "type H" (or
"competent type") if a =aH,and a "type L" (or "incompetent type") if
=Itis also convenient to define +aH,and = +
Wewill initially focus our attention on the final election period, t =1-2.
Clearly, the winner of the T-2 election has no incentive to distort in T-1 or T.
Thus E(W(E11)] =E[W*(CT_l)]if the incumbent wins and similarly for his
opponent. By eqs. (13)—(16), voters with priors p(g,r) will set
(1jf + (1_)QL -Qo+ q -q° 0,
(17) v=
( 0,otherwise.
The incumbent can infer p(g, T) when formulating his election-year fiscal
policy, but he must act before observing q -q°(see again table 1). The
incumbent's estimate of his probability of re—election, conditional on his
information set, is given by
(18) E'(u((g,r), q -q°j}•Jr((g,T)]=
1-G(&7°-(g,T)QH-(1-p(g,T)]QL)
where G is the probability distribution function of q -q0.If the
incumbent knows p(g,r), he can calculate for any fiscal policy the probability
that q -q0will be high enough for him to win. The possibility for signalling
arises here because by eq. (6), there is a limit to how much an incumbent
would be willing to distort fiscal policy in order to fool the public about
his competency type. (As a representative agent, he too cares about the mix
of consumption and investment.)12
Using eqs. (3), (4), (6), (11) and (18), one can write an incumbent of type
i's maximization problem as:
(19) max Z(g,T,p(g,T),']x'n((g,r)]+W(g,T,c1); i =L,H,
g,1
s.t. to (10), where
(20) [X(1+) + —fl0), i= L, H.
The first term on the right-hand side of (19) is the incumbent's expected
chance of winning, ir,multipliedby his surplus from winning c'.Examining
eq. (20), we see that this surplus consists of two components: The termX(+2)
captures the (discounted) ego rents for periods t+1 and t+2, and the term
-O)is the amount by which the representative agent's expected
utility would be higher if the incumbent wins instead of his opponent.
Two features distinguish the objective functions of a competent type and an
incompetent type in (19). First, a competent type knows that expected social
welfare will be higher if he is re—elected than if his unknown opponent wins.
An incompetent knows the opposite to be true.I assume that xL >0.Other-
wise an incompetent simply will not run for re—election, in which case both
types are free to pursue their optimal full-information fiscalpolicy.12
The second difference between the two types is that at any given level of r -g,
a type H is investing - = — moreunits into kt+i than a type L is,
by eq. (2). By eq. (11), the utility value of this difference is
(21) W(g,T,eH) —W(g,T,EL)=(V(r+- g)—V(T+EL—gfl.
Since V" <0,a type H can raise government consumption spending or cut taxes
at lower marginal cost than can a type L, at any given (g, r).13
V. Sequential Equilibria
The interaction between incumbent politicians and rational voters here can
be thought of as a multi-dimensional signalling problem, with g and T as
signals of the incumbent's (contemporaneously) unobserved competency.
Multidimensional signalling games have recently been analyzed in the
industrial organization literature by Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and by Bagwell
and Ramey (1987). In this section, I will follow these authors' general
approach for characterizing an equilibrium. First, I consider all sequential
equilibria (see Kreps and Wilson (1982)] which are separating. In a separating
equilibrium, voters can exactly infer the incumbent's competency shock from his
fiscal policy. There turn out to be a multiplicity of separating equilibria
but, by using a refinement of sequential equilibrium (sequential elimination of
dominated strategies; Moulin (1979) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986)], it is
possible to rule out all but one.I then consider pooling equilibria, in which
incompetent types might mimic the fiscal policy of competent types. Using a
further refinement, due to Cho and Kreps (1987), one can rule out any
undominated pooling equilibria. The unique equilibrium which survives both
refinements is separating. Competent types set taxes too low and government
spending too high before elections, whereas incompetent types pursue their full-
information policy.
A. Definition of Equilibrium
For the moment, we will restrict attention to pure strategies. For
=L,H, let (g1, T1) describe a strategy for the incumbent leader, and let
q -q0]describe a strategy for voters.13 Then the pair
((g1, r1), i =L,H; u((g,T), q —q°]}describes a sequential equilibrium
(in pure strategies) if:14
(a) Voters set vaccordin9to (17); (b) an incumbent of type i chooses
(g', r1) to solve his maximization problem (19); and (c) agents'
beliefs are Bayes—consistent:
If (9L, rL) (gH, rH), then (9L, Tt) =o, (9HTH)= 1.
If (9L, TL) =(gH,rH),then(91, T') =p,i =L,H.
For the remainder of section V I use the term "equilibrium" as an abbreviation
for "sequential equilibrium."
B. Separating Eguilibria
In a separating equilibrium, (gL, TL)(9H, TN) (gL, TL) =0and
(9H TH) =1.
Theorem 1: In any separating equilibrium, (9L., TL) [g*(CL), l.*(€L)].
Proof:Suppose, in contradiction to the theorem, that (gL,TL)
(L L) (g*(cL), T*(€Lfl. This would violate optimality condition (19)
since for any p(g*(EL), T*(€L)],
Z(g*(CL), T*(L) (g*(cL) T*(CL)] L} —Z(,L o,EL)> 0.
Q.E.D.
In other words, jf (,L)were indeed a separating equilibrium fiscal policy
for a type L then, by definition, voters must know that he is incompetent, i.e.
L) =0.So a type L can only gain by defecting and choosing his full
information fiscal policy, (g*(EL), T*(CL)].
To demonstrate the existence of any particular separating equilibrium, it
is necessary to specify what voters would believe if they saw a (g, i)15
different from (gL, TL) or (9H TH). Sequential equilibrium (without the
refinements I will later apply) places no restrictions whatsoever on these
"off—the—equilibrium" path beliefs, except that they must be sufficient to
induce the incumbent leader to choose his equilibrium fiscal policy. For
the present, the most convenient specification of off-the—equilibrium path
beliefs is that p(g, T) =01 (g, r) (g'1, Given these beliefs, condition
(19) is satisfied for a type L if(gHTH) A, where
(22) A((9H, TH)IZ(g*(CL) r*(CL) Q, —Z(gH,H, 1, ( 0).
In figure 1, set A is contained within the dashed ellipse, and point I is
(g*(CL), .r*(EL)]. The set A is necessarily convex as drawn, since W is
strictly concave in Tandg. A type L would prefer to choose any point
within the dashed ellipse instead of choosing point I if by doing so, he
could fool the public into thinking that he is a type H. Our assumption
the U and V obey Inada conditions, together with the assumption that
urn V(k) =-, insurethat the dashed ellipse lies inside the boundaries
k-O
L g >0,r <Vr +c—g>0.Point J in figure 1 corresponds to
(g*(), T*(EH)]. Because all goods are normal, point J must lie southeast of
point I. Whether point J lies within the dashed ellipse (in which case it can-
not be a separating equilibrium strategy for a type H) depends on a number of
factors. It is more likely to be interior the larger X (ego rents), the
smaller - andthe lower the variance of q -q°.
By optimality condition (19), another necessary condition for separating
equilibrium is that TH)€ B, where
(23) 6((g11, H)z(gH, T11, 1,LH) — Z[g*(CH),T*(CH), o, Hi 0).
The large solid ellipse in figure 1 contains the convex, compact set 8. The16
shaded area is 8 fl At, where A' is the complement of A. Any point inthe
shaded region can be a separating equilibrium strategy for a type H.
Definition 1: A separating equilibrium is given by
((gH, TH) BA', (gL, 1L) =(g*(CL),T*(CL)]).
Theorem 2: 8 fl A' is a nonempty, compact set.
Proof: Using the definition of Z in (19) and (20), the theorem follows
directly from the fact > andV" <0. Q.E.D.
C. Undominated Separating Equilibria
The multiplicity of equilibria in figure 1 can be drastically reduced
(to a single point) by placing a very plausible restriction onvoters' off-the-
equilibrium path beliefs. Consider point E in figure 1, for example,and point
o which lies along the ray JE. Clearly, if p =1at both 0 and E, a type H
would never choose E over D. Point E can only obtain as a separating
equilibrium if voters think that for some reason, a type L might choose point
D. But such beliefs are implausible because a type L would be better off
choosing point I than point 0, no matter what the difference is between
p at I versus 0. Formally, a point (,) isdominated for type i, I =L,H if
(24) Z(g*(c'), r*(c'), 0, c] —Z(,,1,e) >0.
Ln figure 1, any point outside the dashed ellipse is dominated for a type L,
and any point outside the large solid ellipse is dominated for a type H. We
shall rule out dominated equilibria by requiring that p =1at any point such
that (24) holds for L but not for H, and p =0if (24) holds for H but not
for L. The set of points which are dominated for L but not H is precisely 8fl A',17
the shaded region in figure 1. Thus, for any (9, r)E Bfl A', p =1.For all
(g, r)B nA',weshall assume p =0.In an undominated separatinq
equilibrium, condition (19) will hold if (9H, TH) is chosen to solve
(25) max W(g, r,
g,T
st. (10) and (g, T)A'.
Theorem 3: There exists a unique, undominated separating equilibrium, and in
this equilibrium U1(y -T,g) =U2(y
—T,g).
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that the condition U1 =U2,which implicitly defines the curve T =
isprecisely the same as one of the first-order conditions for the full
information optimum, given by eq. (12). Hence p' < 0, and 4(g) passes through
points I and J in figure 1. The undominated equilibrium is given by point C
in figure 1 where g > g*(6H) and r < T*(€). The second-order conditions are
met at point C, but not at point F.14
Note that in the unique undominated separating equilibrium, there is a
political budget cycle (on average). Taxes are suboptimally low at point C and
government consumption spending is suboptimally high. Although government
investment is too low, signalling is "efficient" in the sense that a realloca-
tion of expenditures between private and government consumption cannot yield
voters higher welfare.15
0. Pooling Equilibria
Sequential elimination of dominated strategies is not necessarily
sufficient to rule at all pooling equilibria. For example, if p is large18
enough, then (gL, TL) =(9H,TH) =[g*(H),T*(EH)]; (g*(H) r*(cH)] =
canbe an undominated pooling equilibrium. Here, by applying a further ref me-
ment of sequential equilibrium, I show that one can rule out undominated pooling
equilibria (in both pure and mixed strategies).
Following Cho and Kreps, an equilibrium {(9L, TL), (gH, TH)) is
unintuitive if there exists a point (,) suchthat
(26)Z(, ,1,£H) -Z(gH,TH, (gH, TH), CH] >0,
and
(27)Z(, ,i, —Z(gL,L, (gL, T1),EL]<0.
Condition (26) states that a type H would prefer to select (g, )over
(OIl, 1.H if, by doing so, he could convince the public of his true type.
Condition (27) states that a type L would prefer to select (9L, t.L) and
elicit voters' equilibrium response p(gL, 1L), than to choose (,) evenif
p(, )= 1.An equilibrium is intuitive if it is not unintuitive.
Theorem 4: All pooling equilria are unintuitive.
Proof: See Appendix.
One can easily confirm that the unique undominated separating equilibrium
is also an intuitive equilibrium. Henceforth, I reserve the term "equilibrium"
to refer to the unique, undominated, intuitive, sequential equilibrium.
VI. Multiple Elections
The extension to the case where there are many elections is straightfor—
ward, given the "overlapping generations" MA(1) stochastic structure of the
model. We first observe that equilibrium strategies in period T-2 depend on19
but are otherwise independent of all variables dated 1-3 or earlier.
Since k and a are observed by voters with a one-period lag, a leader's actions
in T-3 have no effect on E_2(a1_3), and thus no effect on his chances ofre-
election in 1-2. Therefore, the leader's maximization problem in the off-
election year 1-3 reduces to the full information problem (11). Thisargument
is readily extended to prove
Theorem 5: For finite I and for any integer s, 0 <s 1/2,
ICT_2s+1)? T(C1_251)]=(g*(c121),T—2s+1
In off-election years, the incumbent follows his full-information fiscal policy.
There is no incentive to distort in a pre—election year because information
asymmetries are temporary. Voters are able to monitor the government perfectly
with one-period lag.
Given that W..3 =W_3,the incumbent's problem in the penultimate election
year 1-4 is exactly the same as in 1-2, except that we replace x1 in eq. (20)
with ,where
(20') =(X(1+)+- Q]+X(3+$4)[pir(1)+(1—p),r(0)].
The first term on the RHS of eq. (20') is the same as in eq. (20). Itcap-
tures the ego rents the leader would get in 1-3 and 1-2 if re-elected in 1-4,
and the expected welfare difference in T-3 and 1-4 for the representative
voter. The second, additional, term in (20') captures the ego rents the
leader would get in 1-1 and 1, if re-elected twice. The term pir(1) +
(l-p),r(0)is incumbent's equilibrium expected chance of winning in T—2,
conditional on winning in 1-4. Eq. (20') extends trivially to the case of n20
elections. Obviously, an incumbent will care more about getting re—elected
the longer his expected term and the lower his discount rate.
We have considered the case of finite T. When I is infinite, there can be
trigger-strategy (or "bootstrap") equilibria, as Rogoff and Sibert (1988) have
illustrated in a related context. The equilibrium studied here remains an
equilibrium for I infinite, but it is also possible to have equilibria in which
there is little or no political budget cycle if (a) the leader's rate of time
preference is close to one, (b) exogenous uncertainty (the variance of q here)
is not too large, and (c) elections are spaced closely together.16 Since
elections are typically spaced many years apart, and since exogenous uncer-
tainty is probably quite high, even the optimal trigger—strategy equilibrium
may not be too different from the non-reputational equilibrium I have analyzed
here. Certainly the case for focusing on optimal trigger-strategy equilibria
is weaker in a political budget cycle context than it is in the context of
monetary policy. In setting the nominal money supply, prices, and interest
rates, the government and the private sector interact on a continuous basis.17
VII. Welfare Implications of Political Budget Cycles
Certainly a major reason for trying to develop a fully—articulated
equilibrium model of political budget cycles is to be able to generate well-
motivated empirical predictions. But perhaps the strongest argument for the
equilibrium approach here is that it allows one to consider the welfare impli-
cations of alternative shocks and of alternative regimes. In this section,
I briefly sketch some illustrative examples.21
A. A Constitutional Amendment to Prevent Political Budget Cycles
A natural question is whether it makes sense to pass a constitutional amend-
ment which prevents the government from undertaking changes in fiscal policy
during election years. (Tufte (1978, p. 152) suggests a change in the timing
of the Congressional budget cycle.] Consider an amendment whereby the
government would have to commit to both r1)and Tt) in of f-
election period t—1. If forced to bind himself tor)in period t—1, it
is easy to see that the incumbent leader would always solve
H L (28) max E_1W(g.) = Pw(g +a )+(l_p)W(gt, Tt, a_1 + a ).
Forcingthe incumbent to commit in advance to election-year fiscal policy
precludes signalling, and thus eliminates the political budget cycle. There
are two costs. First, the public no longer has any way of distinguishing
between H and L types when voting. If for simplicity we ignore the q-q0 shock,
then the mean cost of this lost information is p(d1 -°). Thesecond cost is
that the leader is constrained from reacting to period-t information in setting
his period-t fiscal policy.
The relative costs and benefits of the constitutional amendment are
transparent in two extreme cases. If X =0and there are no ego rents, then
in the absence of restrictions the incumbent always sets fiscal policy opti-
mally. In this case, a constitutional amendment makes no sense. More
generally, as long as point C lies near point J in figure 1 (and p is not too
large), the unrestricted signalling equilibrium is to be preferred. At the
opposite extreme, as X ,election—yearfiscal distortions are catastrophic
whenever = (Evenso, the public tends to vote for him! By the time they
go to the polls, election-year fiscal policy is a sunk cost, and they vote22
based only on expected future welfare). In this case a constitutional amendment
is the lesser evil. One can also show that the constitutional amendment is
always preferred for p sufficiently close to one, though I will not go into
details. (Note that a type H must signal by the same amount to prove that he is
competent when p =.999as when p =.001).
C. Risks of a Constitutional Amendment
The analysis of the preceding subsection, if anything, overstates the eff i-
cacy of placing constitutional constraints on election-year fiscal policy.
Realistically, the incumbent has a wide array of fiscal actions with which he
can signal, and it is probably impossible to constrain him in all dimensions.
Here I show that to be welfare improving, a constitutional amendment must be
strict enough to prevent a type H from finding any way to use fiscal policy to
signal his type. Otherwise, a constitutional amendment can only exacerbate
the welfare costs of the political budget cycle. The intuition for this result
is simple. In the absence of legal constraints, a competent incumbent will
maximize the welfare of a representative agent subject to the incentive—
compatibility constraint that his action be one a type L would not
choose to imitate (program (25)]. A constitutional amendment, if it does not
preclude all separating equilibria, will only have the effect of inducing a
competent incumbent to solve (25) subject to an additional constraint. The
informal argument I have just presented does not take into account the effects
of the constitutional constraint on the incentive-compatibility constraint.
The argument is completed below:
Consider a constitutional constraint of the type
(29) T= qi(g), j,' >0.23
In figure 2, the bold curve is j(g). s is drawn as a continuous, monotically
increasing function; e.g., a balanced budget amendment. However, qs(g) may take
on virtually any form. In fact, the main result below would still hold if (29)
were an inequality constraint.
Given the constitutional constraint but in the absence of temporary infor-
mation asymmetries, the incumbent would set (g,T) to maximize (11) subject to
(29). Denote the solution to this problem as (g**(E1), T**(e1)], I =L,H.
The incentive—compatibility conditions for the constitutionally-constrained
case, given below, are analogous to (22) and (23)
(30) Z(g**(CL), T**(CL), 0, L] —Z(gH,TH, 16L) > 0,
(31) Z(gH, TM 1, -Z(g**(CH),T**(CH) 0, c] 0.
In figure 2, the large dashed ellipse represents the set of points (gH, TH)
such that (30) holds with equality, and the solid ellipse is the set of points
such that (31) holds with equality. A crucial fact is that the smaller dashed
ellipse, which corresponds to the dashed ellipse in figure 1 and borders set A,
must be constained within the larger dashed ellipse, since Z(g*(EL), .I.*(EL)o, L]
> Z(g**(eL), r**(EL), 0, Point C in figure 2, as in figure 1, denotes
the undominated intuitive equilibrium strategy for a type H in the absence of
a constitutional constraint. Point F in figure 2 is (g**(EL), T**(EL)] and
point G is (g**(EH), T**(EH)]; both points lie along the constitutional
constraint (29). Point M is the constitutionally-constrained equilibrium level
of (gH, rH).l8 Clearly, the representative voter worse off at II than at C.
Other efforts to dampen the political budget cycle can also prove counter-
productive. For example, it is well known that there can be strategic
advantages.to having a politically independent central bank.19 However,24
contrary to popular belief, central bank independence can exacerbate the welfare
costs of political budget cycles. If the number of instruments at the
government's disposal is reduced, signalling becomes less efficient.
0. Self-Financed Campaign Advertising as a Substitute Signal
Might there exist a less socially—destructive mechanism via which competent
incumbents can signal their abilities? In this section, 1 consider whether a
competent type would be willing to spend money out of his own pocket on campaign
advertising, instead of signalling solely via fiscal policy. Of course, the
incumbent has no incentive whatsoever to be honest in his advertisements. He
will always claim to be a type H. All the public can actually learn from adver-
tising is how much the incumbent is willing to sacrifice from his own consump-
tion in order to be re-elected. Formally, campaign advertising here will
correspond to having the incumbent publicly destroy a units of his own personal
endowment of the private good.2° This dissipative action need not take the form
of campaign advertising. Any form of (publicly observable) self-flagellation
will do.
With campaign advertising, W in (11) is replaced by
(32) (g, T, a, c) =U(y-— a,g) +V(T+c-
wherea ) 0. Under full information, a*(c') =0for i =L,H, and g*(c),
are the same as before. Let (g, T,a,p, c') be the same as Z in
eqs. (19), except with W replaced by ,andp(g,r) replaced by p(g, T,a).The
conditions for a separating equilibrium are the same as before, except
replaces Z in (22) and (23).25
Following the same approach as in section V.C, one can show that in an
undominated separating equilibrium, a type H sets (gH, TH, aH) to solve
(33) max (g, T, CH)
g,r,a
s.t.
(34) (g*(cL), T*(CL) L) g, T a 1, CL) 0,
(35) g, a, (T + C -g) 0.
Theorem 6: In an undominated separating equilibrium, (9L 1L aL)
=(g*(cL),T*(CL), 0]a11 =0,and (g11TH) solves (25).
Proof: See Appendix.
A type H incumbent could use advertising to signal his type but by Theorem 6,
he will always prefer to do it with fiscal policy alone. The option of adver-
tising has no effect on the political budget cycle. A type H finds it
inefficient to set a > 0 because he has no comparative advantage in self—
advertising. His marginal cost to raising a one unit is U., the same as for a
type L.
E. Reducing Ego-Rents
If there exists some way to eliminate the leader's ego rents without other-
wise distorting his behavior, that would be the first-best policy. Society
could pass a constitutional amendment which forces any incumbent running for
re-election to pay a fee. This is equivalent to legislating a )> 0 in the
preceding section. It is easily shown that such a scheme be welfare
improving, though not enough to attain the full-information equilibrium. (If
is large enough, only competent types will run for re—election. However,
they will then distort fiscal policy towards having low taxes.) As a practical26
matter, incumbents differ greatly in wealth and future earning power, and it
may be difficult to properly index a.
F. Endogenous Elections
A very interesting extension of this analysis is to the case where the
incumbent has the option of calling a new election after the first period of
his term. Such an option is characteristic of the political system in many
countries. A call for early elections can itself be a signal, and one can
show that a type H will not need to distort as much during an "early election"
as he does during a regular election (see Terrones (1987)]. However, a system
with endogenous elections is not necessarily better because political budget
distortions tend to occur more frequently. It is not possible to include a
thorough analysis of endogenous elections here, but I have mentioned it as an
example of the usefulness of this general framework.
VIII. Conclusions
This paper does not fully resurrect the theory of political business
cycles.I do, however, present a theory of what I term "political budget
cycles."21 Indeed, it seems that earlier (Keynesian) political business cycle
models may have mislead researchers into focusing excessively on tests for
cycles in national unemployment and output statistics. Not only do these
models rely on questionable Phillips curve foundations, but by restricting
attention to national elections, they lead empirical researchers to conduct
tests based on only a very limited number of data points. In contrast, the
equilibrium theory developed here applies to state and local as well as to
national elections. Thus one should ultimately be able to construct an
extensive cross-sectional data set with which to test the positive predictions
of the model. After extending the analysis to allow for the endogenous timing of27
elections, as discussed in section VII, it will also be possible to study
countries which do not have fixed—term elections.
It may seem odd to try to analyze elections and macroeconomic policy
cycles within a representative-agent paradigm. But this simplification cuts
to the core of the issue, which is that (a) politicians of all stripes enjoy
the status they derive from holding high office, and (b) other things equal,
all voters prefer to see the government managed efficiently. Any incumbent
will try to look competent prior to an election. By employing the represen-
tative agent paradigm, one can precisely analyze the welfare implications of a
broad number of interventions within an equilibrium framework. However, in
future research, it would certainly be desirable to try to integrate the present
analysis with heterogeneous-agent models, which have been explored by Alesina
(1987) and Ferejohn (1986).28
Appendix




whereK0x'1r(O)-,r(1)]+W*(eL).Thenthe Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
(Al) U1 —V—A(U1 -$V1)0 (=0if-T>0),
(A2)U2_VA_A(U2-V) 0 (=0 ifg>0),
(A3) K0-U(-T, g) _$V(T+CL_g) 0 (=0 ifA>0),
whereV =V'(T+-g).
The Inada conditions insure an interior solution, and hence (Al) and (A2) imply
(A4) U1( -T,g) =U2(
-T,g).
Eq. (A4) is the same as eq. (12) and defines the income expansion path
=•(g).Since both goods are normal, $' < 0, and (A3) and (A4) are
satisfied with equality at exactly two points. At point C in figure 1, > U1,
i =H,L, and A =(U1
—$V)/(U1
—V1)< 1. At point F, < U1 and A > 1.
To check the second-order conditions at points C and F, form
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U22> 0 because c and g are normal goods. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose (gP, TP) is any point which is selected with positive probability
by both types in a pooling equilibrium. Let R1(g, r)Z(g, r, 1, £) —
zgP,T, (gP, c'], i =L,H. Select the unique pair [,$()] suchthat
(a) 4) - <T*(eH) -g*(CH)and (b) RH(, $()]= 0.The existence of this
pair is assured by V'(O) =-. SinceU( -cp(g),g] U(V -T,gP) whenever
-g=- gP,and since ir(i) > ir(), then by (b), •()- < -gP.
Hence by V" < 0, RLIj, 4(i)] < 0. By the continuity of R1, there8 > 0 such
that RHE -8,4 -6)]> 0 and RL[ -5q -8))< 0. Q.E.D.
Geometrically, there must always exist some point on •(g) sufficiently
far southeast of J in figure 1 such that both (26) and (27) hold.30
Proof of Theorem 6
A = - Ta,g) +V(T+-g)
+A[K0







(A7) (A —1)U.+90 (=0if a >0),
(AS) K0-U(-T-a,g) - + T +- g)0 (=0if A >0),
(A9) a 0 (=0if 9 >0).
Assume in contradiction to the theorem that a >0.Then 9 =0,(A7) must
hold with equality, and hence A =1.But then (A5) and (A6) require
V( +- g)=V'(T+ — g)
which is impossible. Hence a =0is the only solution, in which case U1 =U2.
The proof that second-order conditions hold at the optimum is similar to
the proof of theorem 3. Q.E.D.31
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1See, for example, Nordhaus (1975), Tufte (1978), and Golden and Poterba
(1980). Recent examples of the extensive empirical literature on "political
business cycles" include Alesina and Sachs (1986), Beck (1987), Haynes and Stone
(1987), and Williams (1987).
2Rogoff and Sibert (1988) show that political budget cycles can be the
outcome of an equilibrium signalling process. The model provided in that
paper is not sufficiently articulated, however, to analyze the normative
issues raised here. Also, the Rogoff-Sibert model allows only for uni-
dimensional signalling. The generalization to multidimensional signalling
provided here turns out to be critical for analyzing electoral and constitu-
tional reforms.
number of previous authors have addressed normative aspects of political
budget cycles. See Lindbeck (1976), Tufte (1978), Chappell and Keech (1983),
Keech and Simon (1985), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), and Willet (1987). None
of these analyses are based on fully-specified equilibrium models, however.
4Tufte (1978, p. 149) also suggests that political businesscycles may be
socially beneficial. He argues that the government may tend to distribute
income more equitably prior to elections than it does at other times.
5The analysis would be similar in mostrespects if c entered the production
function multiplicatively, either multiplying g +kor k alone. There would be
some differences since a change in c then has price effects as well as income
effects, but the welfare results insectionVII would be qualitatively unchanged.
61f the incumbent can only run for re—electiona finite number of times, the
model predicts that there will be no political budget cycle in his last term.
In Rogoff and Sibert (1988), there are two competing political parties instead
of individual candidates.
7me MACi) stochastic structure here is consistent with Fair's(1987)
finding that for U.S. presidential elections, voters do not take into account
the opposition party's economic performance when it was last in power.
81n (6), the leader cares about his "looks" shockjust as much as private
citizens do. All the results below would be exactly the same if 1?didnot
enter into an agent's utility function during periods he is the leader. Also,
an implicit constraint in (6) is that the leader is not legally allowed to tax
himself differently from other individuals.
k may be thought of as investment in defense, vesting of public pension
funds, off-budget loan guarantees and, in general, any type of government expen-
diture whose effects are observed by the typical voter only with a lag.34
101n part because Tisnot the only signal, there always exists a separating
equilibrium in the asymmetric information case, even if Tisconstrained to be
positive.
That (g*(c), T*()] is the unique global maximum follows from the fact that
U and V are strictly concave, and the constraint set (governed by eqs. (2) and
(9)] is convex.
120ne can extend the present analysis to allow for a continuum of types. In
this case, types x1 < 0 drop out and all types x' 0 run for re-election.
There is still (on average) a political budget cycle, as any incumbent running
for re—election has an incentive to pose as a higher type than he actually is.
13i am abbreviating (g1, T;at_i)as (g', rt).
level set of W(g, r, LH) passing through point C has greater curvature
than does the level set of W(g, T, cL) passing through C, and vis-versa at F.
The formal proof is in the appendix.
151f the ego rents (X) are large enough, the election—year fiscal policy of
a type H can be so distortionary that the public would be better off drawing a
type L. This is true even taking into account that expected post-election
social welfare is unambiguously higher under a type H. Of course, the public
does not re—elect a type H out of masochistic tendencies. By the time they go
to the polls, election-period fiscal distortions are a sunk cost, and they
vote based only on expected future welfare.
16Ferejohn (1986) considers trigger—strategies in a model of voter control
over politicians.
17See Rogoff (1987) for a survey of reputational models of monetary policy.
18There may not exist any fully separating equilibrium under a
constitutional constraint. Of course, no pure—strategy pooling equilibrium
can yield higher welfare than the solution to (28). Here I restrict attention
to constitutiona} constraints which admit at least one separating equilibrium.
19See Rogoff (1985).
20Milgrom and Roberts (1986) model advertising this way.In their model,
advertising may be used as a signal even in an undominated equilibrium. In
Bagwell and Ramey's (1987) analysis, advertising is used in the undominated
equilibrium only if it would have a direct positive effect on demand under
full information.
may be possible to extend the model to generate electoral cycles in
employment. In the present model, taxes are lump sum, but suppose instead
taxes distort the labor-leisure decision. One might then expect labor supply
to rise during election years when tax rates are low, and to fall in of f-
election years.35
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